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 
Abstract
Studying evolutionarily successful behavior we show in a general framework that when
individuals maximizing payo  di erentials invest resources in punishing others Interestingly
these investments are increasing in individuals own wealth and decreasing in the wealth of
others
  Introduction
Experimental evidence suggests that many individuals have a preference for punishing others
even though these punishments in ict costs on themselves see eg Bolton and Zwick  or
Abbink et al   who provide very strong support for this punishment hypothesis Huck
and Oechssler  show that a preference for revenge	 will typically be stable in the context
of ultimatum games which implies that resources are almost always split equally Sethi and
Somanathan  show that punishments can be evolutionarily successful in the context of
common resource games since they help to establish cooperative behavior
In this paper we show in a more general framework that costly punishment of others can be
evolutionarily pro
table The intuition of this result is simple If a punitive action harms others
more than oneself one can increase one	s relative payo by carrying out this action and since
evolution is not driven by absolute but by relative payos such actions may be evolutionarily
successful Moreover we show that under plausible assumptions optimal punishment is increas
ing in the personal wealth of the one who punishes and decreasing in the wealth of the one who
is punished
While the term punishment	 is often understood as describing a reciprocal actionsomeone
who was treated in an unkind way responds by harming his opponentwe do not restrict the
analysis to this kind of negative reciprocity More generally we consider any actions harming
others no matter why the actions are carried out Thus the analysis covers not only negative
reciprocity but also acts of nastiness or malevolence
The results from this analysis are quite robust In fact we consider two dierent frameworks
a rather simple one in Section  in which only one individual can carry out a punitive action
lowering the average payo of all others and a more complicated but also more plausible
one in Section  in which all individuals have the opportunity to punish all others lowering the
individual payos of others In both sections we establish qualitatively similar results
These results can serve as explanations for some real life phenomena which is discussed in
the concluding Section 
 
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 Model A One against all
Consider a situation in which all individuals of a population have gained some consumable
resources endowing them with a certain absolute material payo The allocation may be the
result of a move of nature the result of a game played by all individuals the result of many
games played by subgroups of the population the result of a market process or the result of
anything else Suppose that given such a situation an individual can carry out an action harming
others by investing some of his resources Of course rational actors whose preferences only rely
on absolute material payos would never carry out such actions However studies of preference
evolution provide clearcut evidence that evolution does not yield types being rational in that
Friedman style	
 
It was Alchian  who 
rst pointed out that this cannot be expected since evolution is
driven by payo dierentials In this study we are interested in evolutionarily successful behav
ior  Therefore we analyse which behavioral consequences are to be expected when individuals
maximize payo dierentials rather than absolute payos

This analysis will yield optimal
punishment proles which can be seen as the behavioral analogon to evolutionarily successful
preferences
First some notation
Let M
i
be individual i	s material payo in the 
rst phase let M
i
be the average material
payo of all others and assume that both variables are observable A punishment pro
le is
described by a function p
i
 R
 
 R prescribing for every vector M
i
 M
i
 a punitive action
p
i
 p
i
M
i
 M
i
 When individual i has carried out a punishment his 
nal payo is denoted
by fM
i
  p
i
 and the average 
nal payo of the others by gM
i
  p
i
 We make the following
straightforward assumptions about f and g
Assumptions 
a Both functions are twice continuously dierentiable Furthermore
 f
 M
i
  and
 g
 M
i
 
ie the 
nal payo is increasing in material wealth gained in the 
rst phase
b
 f
 p
i
  and
 g
 p
i
  ie the 
nal payo is decreasing in i	s punishment
c
 
 
f
 p
 
i
  and
 
 
g
 p
 
i
  ie while the marginal cost of punishments is increasing for
individual i the absolute marginal eect of punishment on others is decreasing
d
 
 
f
 p
i
 M
i
  ie the marginal cost of punishment is decreasing in personal wealth
While assumptions a and b purely re ect the de
nition of punishments assumptions c
and d impose restrictions which however seem very natural
To make model A as simple as possible we assume furthermore that at each point in time
ie after each allocation phase	 only one individual selected by chance has the opportunity to
punish In model B this assumption will be replaced
Now suppose that individuals maximize the payo dierential

fM
i
  p
i
  gM
i
  p
i
 As
we will show this implies that one can derive an optimal punishment pro
le p
 

To compute p
 
one has to solve the following problem
 
Friedman 
 argued that evolutionary forces would bring about such preferences But his conjecture
turned out to be false see eg De Long  Shleifer  Summers  and Waldmann  or Blume and Easley 	 and



For a related approach see Akerlof 

There is a broad class of evolutionary dynamics including the wellknown replicator dynamics in which
growth rates of types depend monotonically on this expression This illustrates well that types who maximize
this expression have the best chances to survive and spread in an evolutionary process

Maximize R
i
M
i
 M
i
  p
i
  fM
i
  p
i
 gM
i
  p
i
 wrt p
i

subject to M
i
 p
i
 
This yields the following lemma
Lemma  The optimal punishment prole is characterized by the implicit function p
 
M
i
 M
i
  
 gM
i
p
i

 p
i

 fM
i
p
i

 p
i
  if gM
i
  p
i
 fM
i
  p
i
and by p
 
i
  otherwise 
Proof The 
rst order condition for maximization of R
i
is
R
i
p
i
 
gM
i
  p
i

p
i

fM
i
  p
i

p
i
  
Due to assumption c R
i
is concave in p
i
 Note that there exists some bp
i
such that
 R
i
 p
i
 
for all p
i
 bp
i
 Therefore equation  has a unique solution with p
i
  if and only if
gM
i
  p
i
 fM
i
  p
i
 
If  does not hold this implies that
 R
i
 p
i
  for all p
i
   
With the help of Lemma  we can prove the following proposition showing that the optimal
punishment pro
le p
 
implies that the amount of punishment or nastiness is increasing in the
material payo gained in the prepunishment phase
Proposition  gM
i
  p
i
 fM
i
  p
i

 p
 
i
M
i
M
i

 M
i
 
Proof Note 
rst that if  holds for some M
i
 M

it also holds for all M
i
 M

 If it holds
let HM
i
 M
i
  p
i
 be the implicit function de
ned by  Applying the implicit function
theorem yields
 p
 
i
M
i
M
i

 M
i
 
 H M
i
 H p
i

 
 
f p
i
 M
i
 
 
f p
 
i
 
 
g p
 
i
  If  does not hold
 p
 
i
M
i
M
i

 M
i
   
While this result may be taken as an evolutionary justi
cation for why the rich are nastier
than the poor	 we next show that under an additional assumption which has some plausibility
our approach may also explain why the poor are treated nastier than the rich	
Proposition  If an individual punishes at all and if
 
 
g
 p
i
 M
i
  then
 p
 
i
M
i
M
i

 M
i
  
Proof Note 
rst that if  holds for some M
i
 M

it also holds due to assumption d
for all M
i
 M

 Now let H be de
ned as before Then
 p
 
i
M
i
M
i

 M
i
 
 H M
i
 H p
i

 
 
g p
i
 M
i
 
 
f p
 
i
 
 
g p
 
i
   
There is a German idiom which tries to summarize the stylized fact	 that in many con icts
those who are worst o in the beginning are those who loose most in con icts since they are
treated most badly Our result shows that such behavioral patterns are evolutionarily pro
table
if the absolute marginal eects of punishments are decreasing in the victim	s wealth In this
case it is more eective to harm somebody who is down already than somebody who is on the
top

 Model B All against all
In the following we will consider a model similar to the above one but with the exception that
after each allocation phase all individuals can punish all individuals ie each individual i is
allowed to carry out a variety of punitive actions directed to other specic individuals This
makes some additional notation necessary
Let M
i
be the private wealth of individual i Let p
ih
h  i be the amount of wealth

individual i invests in harming individual h Let furthermore S
i

P
h i
p
ih
and T
i

P
h i
p
hi

ie S
i
denotes the total amount of wealth individual i invests in punishments and T
i
denotes
the total amount of wealth which is invested by others to punish i Let f   R

  R be the
function capturing the 
nal material payo with f depending on M
i
 S
i
 and T
i
 Finally let N
  f      ng be the set of individuals A punishment pro
le is now characterized by a mapping
p   R
n
  R
n
which prescribes for given material wealth of all individuals a vector of punitive
actions p
i
 p
i
    p
ii
  p
ii
  p
in

Assuming similar preferences as above we can denote the objective function of individual i
as
R
i
M S  T   fM
i
  S
i
  T
i


n
n
X
j
fM
j
  S
j
  T
j

where M  M

   M
n
  S  S

    S
n
  T  T

    T
n

Concerning the function f we make the following assumptions
Assumptions 
a The function f is twice continuously dierentiable in all entries Furthermore
 f
 M
i
 
b
 f
 S
i
  and
 f
 T
i
  ie 
nal payo is decreasing in punishments
c
 
 
f
 S
 
i
  and
 
 
f
 T
 
i
  ie while the marginal cost of punishments is increasing the
absolute marginal eect of punishment on others is decreasing
d
 
 
f
 S
i
 M
i
  ie the marginal cost of punishment is decreasing in personal wealth
To derive the optimal punishment pro
le we must now consider the eects of interaction at
the second stage The question is which punitive actions are optimal when also all others can
carry out punishments This means nothing but solving the second stage as a game in which all
individuals maximize R
i

First of all we show that this subgame the second phase has an equilibrium To do this we
have to solve the following problem simultaneously for all i  N 
Maximize R
i
M S  T  fM
i
  S
i
  T
i


n
n
X
j
fM
j
  S
j
  T
j
 wrt p
i
subject to
X
h i
p
ih
M
i

and p
ih
  for all h  N
i
where N
i
  Nnfig
Now let the strategy space of individual i be P
i
 
n
p
i
 R
n

 
P
h  i
p
ih
M
i
o
which is a
nonempty compact and convex subset of the Euclidean space R
n
 Because of the assumptions

Here  we take already for granted that selfpunishment is never optimal

made above the payo function R
i
of each individual i is continuous in all entries and concave in
p
i
 Therefore we can apply a wellknown existence theorem see eg Theorem  in Fudenberg
and Tirole  p  and conclude that for each M  M

   M
n
  R
n

system  has a
solution p
 
 p
 

    p
 
n
  R
nn

which because of the concavity of the functions R
i
is unique
ie due to the theorem p
 
is the unique purestrategy Nash equilibrium of the second phase
subgame Note that each p
 
i
i  N  is itself a vector ie p
 
i
 p
 
i
    p
 
ii
  p
 
ii
    p
 
in

consisting of the punitive actions executed by individual i in equilibrium
In the following we will establish results analogous to those of model A
Imagine a situation where given M  R
n

 each individual except i which is 
xed in the
following chooses his actions according to the Nash solution eg only individual i is left to
choose a strategy in reaction to what the others do Thus only individual i  N has to solve the
maximization problem  The according KuhnTucker conditions can be written as follows
R
i
p
ih
   p
ih
  and p
ih
 
R
i
p
ih
 

  for all h  i 
M
i

X
h i
p
ih
     and 


M
i

X
h  i
p
ih

A
  
This is a set of simultaneous conditions which determine the optimal strategy for individual i
that is known to exist Assume that we have an inner solution p
 
i
 ie p
 
ih
  for all h  N
i
and
P
h i
p
ih
 M
i
which because of  implies that    Then according to  the following
simultaneous equations must hold
n 
fM
i
  S
i
  T
i

S
i

fM
h
  S
h
  T
h

T
h
  for all h  N
i

Denoting the left hand sides of these equations with F
h
i
for all h  i we can write down the
system

F
h
i
p
i
    p
ii
  p
ii
    p
in
M

   M
n
   for all h  i 
For obvious reasons let us call p
ih
h  i the endogenous variables and M
i
i  N  the
exogenous variables First of all from Theorem  in Fudenberg and Tirole  we know
that the above system has the solution p
 
i
 p
 
i
    p
 
ii
  p
 
ii
    p
 
in
  ie the point p
 
i
 M
satis
es  Second due to our assumptions all F
h
i
have continuous partial derivatives with
respect to all variables In order to apply the implicit function theorem we have to check that
for the Jacobian jJ
i
j   of the endogenous variables p
i
    p
ii
  p
ii
    p
in
of system  it is
true that jJ
i
j   at the point  p
 
i
 M
Let us agree upon the following notation f
j
  fM
j
  S
j
  T
j
  j  N 
Remark  According to assumptions a and c for the endogenousvariable Jacobian jJ
i
j   it
holds that

Note that the functions F
h
i
also depend on p
 
jk
  j   N
i
  k   N
j
  ie the punitive actions in equilibrium
of all other individuals j   i which we consider as parameters in the following analysis and which are therefore
skipped

jJ
i
p
 
i
 Mj

















 F

i
 p
i
  
 F

i
 p
ii
 F

i
 p
ii
  
 F

i
 p
in















 F
i
i
 p
i
  
 F
i
i
 p
ii
 F
i
i
 p
ii
  
 F
i
i
 p
in
 F
i
i
 p
i
  
 F
i
i
 p
ii
 F
i
i
 p
ii
  
 F
i
i
 p
in















 F
n
i
 p
i
  
 F
n
i
 p
ii
 F
n
i
 p
ii
  
 F
n
i
 p
in

















p
 
i
M


n
Q
jN
i
 
 
f
j
 T
 
j

n
n 
 
 
f
i
 S
 
i
P
rC
n 
N
i
 
 
f
r

 T
 
r

 
 
f
r
 
 T
 
r
 
  
 
 
f
r
n
 T
 
r
n





	
  for n even
  for n odd
where C
n 
N
i
is the set of all combinations without repetition of order n  of the set N
i

Proof  See the appendix
Note that this statement holds true not only at the point  p
 
i
 M but due to our assumptions
at all points  p
i
 M  p
i
 P
i
  M  R
n


Thus all conditions of the implicit function theorem are ful
lled and we can write
p
 
ih
 G
ih
M

   M
n
 for all h  N
i
emphasizing that in equilibrium the punitive actions the endogenous variables of individual
i are implicit functions of the initial values of wealth the exogenous variables of all individuals
Our main intention is to look at comparative static implications of this general framework
More precisely we are interested whether an increase of an exogenous variable such as M
i
or
M
h
  h  i results in an increase or a decrease of the equilibrium value of the punitive action
p
 
ih
 ie whether individual i is going to punish individual h h  i harder or not in equilibrium
if the material wealth of individual i or h increases By applying again the implicit function
theorem together with Cramer	s Rule see Chiang  pp  we can write down the relevant
partial derivative for the 
rst statement as
p
 
ih
M

   M
n

M
i



J
ih
p
 
i
 M




J
i
p
 
i
 M


where jJ
ih
j is simply the endogenousvariable Jacobian jJ
i
j with the hth column replaced
by the vector



F

i
M
i
   
F
i
i
M
i
 
F
i
i
M
i
   
F
n
i
M
i

T
 n 

 
f
i
S
i
M
i
          
T

which is evaluated at the equilibrium p
 
i
 M
Remark  According to assumptions a c and d it holds that


J
ih
p
 
i
 M


 
n
n 

 
f
i
S
i
M
i
Y
jN
i
j h

 
f
j
T
 
j




	
  for n even
  for n odd


Proof  See the appendix
We are now ready to state the 
rst result
Proposition  For each i  N and each h  N
i
we have
 p
 
ih
M

M
n

 M
i
 
Proof  According to the Implicit Function Theorem Remark  and  and using Cramer	s Rule
we have
 p
 
ih
M

M
n

 M
i

j
J
ih
p
 
i
M
j
j
J
i
p
 
i
M
j


n
n
 
 
f
i
 S
i
 M
i
Q
jN
i
j h
 
 
f
j
 T
 
j

n
Q
jN
i
 
 
f
j
 T
 
j
 
n
n
 
 
f
i
 S
 
i
P
rC
n 
N
i
 
 
f
r

 T
 
r

 
 
f
r
 
 T
 
r
 

 
 
f
r
n
 T
 
r
n
   
This result is analogous to Proposition  derived in the previous section Again it shows
that those who are rich will invest more in punishments than those who are poor Next we
turn to the question how the equilibrium value of p
 
ih
varies if M
h
changes The relevant partial
derivative is now
p
 
ih
M

   M
n

M
h




J

ih
p
 
i
 M



jJ
i
p
 
i
 Mj
where



J

ih



is again the endogenousvariable Jacobian jJ
i
j with the hth column replaced by
the vector



F

i
M
h
   
F
h
i
M
h
 
F
h
i
M
h
 
F
h
i
M
h
 
F
n
i
M
h

T


 
f
h
T
h
M
h
            
T

which again is evaluated at the equilibrium p
 
i
 M
Remark  According to assumptions a and c it holds that for all h  N
sgn




J

ih
p
 
i
 M





 sgn

B
B


n

 
f
h
T
h
M
h

B
B


Q
jN
ih
 
 
f
j
 T
 
j
 n 
 
 
f
i
 S
 
i

P
rC
n
N
ih
 
 
f
r

 T
 
r

 
 
f
r
 
 T
 
r
 
  
 
 
f
r
n
 T
 
r
n

C
C
A

C
C
A
 
n
 sgn
 

 
f
h
T
h
M
h

Proof  See the appendix
Proposition  For each i  N and each h  N
i
we have sgn

 p
 
ih
M

M
n

 M
h

 sgn

 
 
f
h
 T
h
 M
h



Proof  According to the Implicit Function Theorem Remark  and 	 and using Cramer	s Rule
we have sgn

 p
 
ih
M

M
n

 M
h

 sgn
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This proposition is the analogon to Proposition  in Section  Whether more resources are
invested to punish the rich or the poor depends on the sign of crossderivative
 
 
f
h
 T
h
 M
h
 If it is
positive this means that absolute marginal eects of punishments are higher when the victim
is poorer Then the poor will be treated nastier than the rich
 Conclusion
Basically we have derived three main results The 
rst one is not very surprising That pun
ishing others can be evolutionarily pro
table was quite clear from the beginning The second is
more interesting Under quite general assumptions it turns out that those who are at the top
in the beginning will invest most to stay on the top or more precisely to increase their relative
advantage This result does not seem to be in strong contradiction with casual empiricism Fur
thermore it can be tested by analysing experimental data Fehr and Gchter  conducted
an experiment which has a structure similar to our model B After playing a round of a public
good provision game subjects were informed about the outcome and had the opportunity to
punish their opponents Fortunately Fehr and Gchter also collected sociodemographic data
about their subjectsin particular income data It shows that the amount subjects invest in
punishment is positively correlated with their income

Of course this is a very rough measure
but it illustrates that our result is not without predictive power
The third result is that harming those who are at the lower tail of the income distribution
might be most eective This result has some  avor of immorality but it has also some signi

cance in real life Though modern societies organize a lot of support for the less fortunate it is
still remarkable how often especially poor and weak people are exploited and harmed by others
This may have evolutionary reasons which probably cannot be fully overridden by a process of
civilization
References
 Abbink K G Bolton A Sadrieh and FF Tang  Adaptive learning versus pun
ishment in ultimatum bargaining SFB Discussion Paper No B University of Bonn
 Akerlof GA  The economics of caste and of the rat race an other woeful tales
Quarterly Journal of Economics  
 Alchian A A  Uncertainty Evolution and Economic Theory Journal of Political
Economy  
 Blume L and D Easley  Evolution and market behavior Journal of Economic
Theory  
 Blume L and D Easley  Evolution and rationality in competitive markets Learning
and Rationality in Economics eds A Kirman and M Salmon OxfordCambridge

The Pearson correlation coecient is small 		 but highly signicant p   

 Bolton G and R Zwick  Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
Games and Economic Behavior  
 De Long JB A Shleifer LH Summers and RJ Waldmann  Noise trader risk in

nancial markets Journal of Political Economy  
 Fehr E and S Gchter  Cooperation and punishment in voluntary contribution
games Working Paper University of Zurich
 Friedman M  Essays in Positive Economics Chicago
 Fudenberg D and Tirole J  Game Theory The MIT Press
 Huck S and J Oechssler  The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair
allocations Working Paper HumboldtUniversity
 Sethi R and E Somanathan  The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property
Resource Use American Economic Review Vol  No 

Appendix
Proof of Remark   Since
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This representation means that in the matrix only the entries of the main diagonal are
occupied by dierent expressions all others are occupied by the expression n

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 
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 Now
use the rule that if the entries of one row can all be written as the sum of the same
number of summands then the determinant can be written as the sum of that number of
determinants of the same order Proceeding that way one gets either determinants where
two rows only consist of the expression n

 
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f
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 
i
which of course are zero or one gets upper
lower triangular determinants which can be computed by simply multiplying the main
diagonal entries This gives the result  
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Now multiply the column that consists of          with n
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to all other columns to get
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In case of h  i vector  forms the hth column of jJ
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Now substract the row whose main diagonal entry is  from all upper or lower rows
to bring this determinant into an upper or lower triangular shape and compute this
determinant by simply multiplying the main diagonal entries  
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Now proceed again as in the proof of Remark  to get determinants that can easily be
computed  
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